Email forwarding and mailing lists break SPF, DKIM, and DMARC. ARC (Authenticated Received Chain) seals authentication results so downstream servers can trust them. Learn how ARC works, how to configure it, and when it saves your deliverability.
ARC (Authenticated Received Chain): How to Preserve Email Authentication Across Forwarding and Mailing Lists
The Problem: Forwarding Breaks Authentication
When an email passes through a forwarder or a mailing list, the message body or envelope typically changes. The forwarder might rewrite the envelope sender with SRS (Sender Rewriting Scheme). A mailing list might add a footer, a subject prefix, or a List-Unsubscribe header. These legitimate modifications break the original authentication.
A message that passed SPF, DKIM, and DMARC at the first hop can arrive at the final destination with a failed DKIM signature, an SPF mismatch, and a DMARC failure. If the destination domain publishes a p=reject DMARC policy, the message gets rejected or quarantined — even though it was entirely legitimate when it left the original sender.
This is not a theoretical edge case. It is the daily reality for millions of messages passing through alumni mailing lists, corporate forwarding rules, mailbox aliases, and third-party email processors. The protocols that protect email also punish its natural routing behavior.
Authenticated Received Chain (ARC), defined in RFC 8617, was designed specifically to solve this. It allows intermediate servers to cryptographically seal the authentication results they observed, creating a trusted chain that downstream receivers can inspect before applying DMARC policy.
What ARC Actually Does
ARC is not a replacement for SPF, DKIM, or DMARC. It is a bridge. It tells the receiving server: "Here is what the authentication looked like when the message entered my infrastructure. You can trust this because I signed it."
ARC adds three new headers to a message as it passes through an intermediate server:
- ARC-Authentication-Results (AAR): A snapshot of the SPF, DKIM, and DMARC results observed at the point of entry. It preserves the original authentication verdict before any local modification.
- ARC-Seal (AS): A cryptographic seal over the ARC chain itself. It covers the previous ARC headers and the AAR, ensuring the chain has not been tampered with.
- ARC-Message-Signature (AMS): A DKIM-like signature over the message headers (and optionally body) as received. It binds the AAR to the message content at that hop.
Each intermediate server that participates in ARC appends its own set of these three headers, building an ordered chain. The final receiver validates the entire chain before making a DMARC policy decision. If the chain validates and the AAR shows the message passed authentication upstream, the receiver can accept the message even if the current SPF or DKIM result is a failure.
The Trust Model
ARC depends on trusting the intermediate servers that added seals. Unlike end-to-end DKIM, where the original sender's key is known in DNS, ARC relies on a local trust list maintained by the receiving organization. Gmail, Microsoft 365, and Yahoo all maintain internal ARC trusted seals lists. Smaller operators can configure their own.
This means ARC is not a universal override. It is a negotiated exception. If an intermediate is not trusted, its ARC seal carries no weight, and DMARC is applied normally.
When ARC Saves a Message from DMARC Rejection
Consider a typical flow:
sender.comsends a message touser@alumni-university.org.- The message passes SPF, DKIM, and DMARC at the university's inbound gateway.
- The university forwards the message to
user@gmail.com. - During forwarding, the envelope changes. SPF now fails because the forwarding IP is not in
sender.com's SPF record. If the message body was altered, DKIM also fails. - Without ARC, Gmail sees a DMARC failure and applies the
sender.compolicy ofp=reject. - With ARC, the university's gateway added an ARC seal attesting that SPF and DKIM passed on entry. Gmail validates the seal, sees the university is a trusted ARC participant, and exempts the message from strict DMARC enforcement.
This same logic applies to mailing lists. A ListServ or Mailman instance that modifies the subject line or appends a footer will break DKIM. ARC allows the list server to vouch for the original authentication state, protecting subscribers whose domains enforce DMARC.
ARC vs SRS vs ARF: Understanding the Difference
ARC is often discussed alongside other forwarding-related mechanisms. They are complementary, not interchangeable.
| Mechanism | What It Fixes | Where It Runs |
|---|---|---|
| SRS | Rewrites the envelope sender so SPF passes at the next hop | Forwarding MTA |
| ARC | Preserves the original authentication verdict for DMARC evaluation | Forwarding or list server, validated by final receiver |
| ARF | Standard format for abuse/feedback reports (unrelated to forwarding) | Reporting systems |
| DKIM | Cryptographic signature over message headers and body | Origin MTA, validated by any receiver |
SRS only fixes SPF. It does nothing for DKIM or DMARC alignment. ARC covers all three protocols by preserving the upstream authentication results. The ideal forwarding setup uses both: SRS to keep SPF valid, and ARC to protect the original DMARC verdict.
Setting Up ARC on Your Mail Server
Postfix with OpenARC
OpenARC is the most common implementation for Postfix. It runs as a milter, inspecting and modifying messages after Postfix queues them.
Step 1: Install OpenARC
On Debian or Ubuntu:
apt update && apt install openarc
On RHEL, Rocky Linux, or AlmaLinux, you may need to build from source or use a third-party repository, as OpenARC is not always in the base repositories.
Step 2: Generate ARC Keys
Generate a 2048-bit RSA key pair for signing:
mkdir -p /etc/openarc/keys
cd /etc/openarc/keys
openssl genrsa -out arc-private.key 2048
openssl rsa -in arc-private.key -pubout -out arc-public.key
Step 3: Publish the Public Key in DNS
Create a TXT record for your selector. The record format is identical to DKIM:
selector._domainkey.yourdomain.com. IN TXT "v=DKIM1; k=rsa; p=MIGfMA0G..."
Replace the public key content with the output of:
cat /etc/openarc/keys/arc-public.key | grep -v "^--" | tr -d '\n'
Step 4: Configure OpenARC
Edit /etc/openarc.conf:
PidFile /run/openarc/openarc.pid
Syslog yes
Domain yourdomain.com
Selector arc2026
KeyFile /etc/openarc/keys/arc-private.key
SignatureAlgorithm rsa-sha256
Canonicalization relaxed/relaxed
Mode sv
Socket inet:8891@localhost
InternalHosts /etc/openarc/internal-hosts
The Mode sv setting means OpenARC will both sign outbound forwarded messages and verify inbound ARC chains. If this server only forwards and does not receive for final delivery, use Mode s.
The InternalHosts file lists IP addresses or CIDR ranges of hosts trusted to inject mail that should receive ARC seals on exit:
127.0.0.1
10.0.0.0/8
192.168.1.0/24
Step 5: Integrate with Postfix
Add the milter to main.cf:
smtpd_milters = inet:localhost:8891
non_smtpd_milters = $smtpd_milters
milter_default_action = accept
Reload Postfix:
systemctl restart postfix
Step 6: Verify
Send a test message through the forwarder and inspect the headers. You should see:
ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=yourdomain.com; s=arc2026; ...
ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=yourdomain.com; s=arc2026; ...
ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; yourdomain.com; spf=pass ...; dkim=pass ...; dmarc=pass ...
The i=1 indicates the first ARC hop. If another server later adds ARC, it will use i=2, and so on.
Exim with OpenARC
Exim supports milters via the spamd_address or external ACL routers, but OpenARC integration is less native than with Postfix. Many Exim administrators run OpenARC as a proxy or use a custom router to pipe messages through openarc-sign and openarc-verify binaries.
A simpler approach for Exim is to run OpenARC as a local milter and connect Exim to it via the acl_smtp_mime or acl_smtp_data ACL:
warn condition = ${if eq {$interface_address}{10.0.0.1}{yes}{no}}
set acl_m_arc = ${readsocket{inet:localhost:8891}{$acl_m_arc}{5s}{}{}}
This is less elegant than Postfix milter integration and may require custom scripting. If your infrastructure depends heavily on Exim and ARC is critical, consider running a lightweight Postfix relay specifically for ARC signing, or evaluate Exim's experimental ARC support in newer versions.
Validating ARC Seals
Manual Inspection
To inspect ARC headers manually, use openarc-verify or parse the headers directly:
openarc-verify < /path/to/message.eml
Look for the arc= result in Authentication-Results:
Authentication-Results: mx.google.com; arc=pass (i=1 d=yourdomain.com);
An arc=pass means the chain validated up to that point. An arc=fail indicates a broken or tampered chain.
Automated Monitoring
For production monitoring, parse the Authentication-Results header in your delivery logs or MTA log stream. Track these metrics:
- ARC pass rate: Percentage of messages with ARC headers where
arc=pass. - ARC override rate: Percentage of DMARC failures that were overridden due to a valid ARC seal.
- Trusted seal failures: ARC chains that failed validation, indicating potential tampering or misconfiguration.
Tools like Rspamd and OpenDMARC can log and report these statistics. Rspamd includes a native ARC module that handles both verification and signing.
Rspamd Native ARC Support
Rspamd is increasingly the preferred mail filtering stack for modern MTAs. It has built-in ARC signing and verification, removing the need for a separate OpenARC milter.
To enable ARC signing in Rspamd:
- Place your private key in
/var/lib/rspamd/dkim/arc-yourdomain.key. - Add to
/etc/rspamd/local.d/arc.conf:
path = "/var/lib/rspamd/dkim/arc-yourdomain.key"
selector = "arc2026"
domain {
yourdomain.com {
path = "/var/lib/rspamd/dkim/arc-yourdomain.key";
selector = "arc2026";
}
}
- Enable ARC in
/etc/rspamd/local.d/milter_headers.conf:
use = ["arc"];
- Restart Rspamd:
systemctl restart rspamd
Rspamd will automatically add ARC seals to messages it processes as an intermediary, and validate ARC on inbound messages. It also integrates ARC results into its composite scoring, making it easy to build policy rules around ARC trust.
Common ARC Misconfigurations
Missing or Incorrect DNS Records
ARC uses the same DNS record format as DKIM. If your selector record is missing, malformed, or has a typo in the subdomain, validation will fail. Use MXToolbox's DKIM lookup tool to verify your ARC selector — it works identically.
Canonicalization Mismatch
If your signing server uses simple/simple canonicalization but the verifying server expects relaxed/relaxed, subtle whitespace or header ordering differences can break validation. Use relaxed/relaxed unless you have a specific reason not to. It is more tolerant of MTA-level header normalization.
Overwriting ARC Headers on Re-entry
Some poorly configured filters strip unknown headers, including ARC headers. If a message passes through such a filter between two ARC-aware servers, the chain is broken. Audit your filtering pipeline for header stripping rules and whitelist ARC-* headers explicitly.
Signing with a Weak Key
Use at least 2048-bit RSA keys for ARC. 1024-bit keys are deprecated and may be rejected by major receivers. Monitor key age and rotate ARC selectors on the same schedule as your DKIM selectors.
ARC in the Wild: Mailbox Provider Support
As of mid-2026, the major consumer and enterprise mailbox providers support ARC verification to varying degrees:
- Gmail: Validates ARC and uses it to inform DMARC disposition decisions for forwarded messages. ARC is widely trusted for consumer Gmail.
- Microsoft 365 / Outlook.com: Supports ARC validation in Exchange Online. Trust is conditional and tied to sender reputation.
- Yahoo Mail: Validates ARC headers and factors them into filtering decisions, though DMARC overrides are more conservative than Gmail.
- Fastmail: Strong ARC support, including validation and signing for forwarded mail.
- Proton Mail: Validates ARC as part of its authentication pipeline.
If your users forward mail to these providers, enabling ARC on your forwarding infrastructure measurably improves delivery rates for sender domains with strict DMARC policies.
ARC and DMARC: Policy Interaction
ARC does not change the DMARC specification. It provides additional data that a receiver may use to override strict DMARC enforcement. RFC 8617 explicitly states that receivers are not obligated to honor ARC seals.
In practice, the override logic looks like this:
- Receiver evaluates SPF and DKIM. Both fail.
- Receiver checks DMARC. Policy is
p=reject. Without ARC, the message is rejected. - Receiver discovers an ARC chain. It validates each seal.
- If the chain validates and the AAR shows
dmarc=passat the first hop, and the intermediate is trusted, the receiver may downgrade the DMARC verdict to a softer action or accept the message. - If the chain fails validation, or the intermediate is untrusted, DMARC is applied normally.
This means ARC is a strong signal, not a guarantee. It works best when the forwarding domain is well-known and reputable — exactly the scenario where DMARC false positives cause the most harm.
Should You Enable ARC?
Enable ARC if your infrastructure meets any of these criteria:
- You operate forwarding services, mailbox aliases, or redirect rules that send mail to external domains.
- You host mailing lists that modify message content or headers.
- You are an email service provider (ESP) or hosting provider where users commonly configure forwarding.
- You receive complaints from senders that their DMARC-enforced mail is being rejected or quarantined after passing through your systems.
If your server only sends direct-to-MX mail and never acts as an intermediary, ARC provides no benefit on the outbound side. However, you should still validate inbound ARC chains if you enforce DMARC, because it improves your filtering accuracy and reduces false positives for forwarded legitimate mail.
Conclusion
ARC solves one of the most frustrating problems in modern email infrastructure: legitimate messages being punished by the very authentication protocols designed to protect them. By creating a cryptographically sealed record of authentication results at each hop, ARC gives receivers the context they need to distinguish malicious spoofing from benign forwarding.
For administrators running forwarding gateways, mailing lists, or multi-hop mail flows, ARC is no longer optional. It is a direct defense against DMARC false positives and a critical component of a mature email authentication strategy. Set it up, monitor it, and keep your keys rotated. Your users — and the senders they receive from — will benefit.